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ABIGAIL ALLIANCE FOR BETTER ACCESS TO
DEVELOPMENTAL DRUGS V. VON ESCHENBACH: ACCESS TO
EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS: IS ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL
DRUGS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT WHEN IT COMES TO THE
TREATMENT OF THE TERMINALLY ILL?
PRESTON W. LESLEY1
ABSTRACT
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of the law.2 In the two hundred years since
James Madison authored the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the Fifth Amendment guarantees more than just fair process,
but also heightened protection against governmental interference with certain fundamental rights.3 But what is a fundamental right? In the wake of
landmark Supreme Court decisions, “the rights to marriage, have children,
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, marital privacy, contraception, bodily integrity, and abortion,” were all deemed fundamental
rights.4 But what about the fundamental right to medical treatment? Even
more complex, what about the fundamental right to experimental medical
treatment? The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act generally prohibits access to
new drugs unless and until they have been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).5 However, gaining FDA approval can be a long and
tumultuous process. For patients with terminal illnesses, the protracted approval times can end in prolonged treatment options and even death. This
article presents the conflicting issues that arise when terminally ill patients
are not afforded the fundamental right to experimental medical treatment.
PROLOGUE: THE ABIGAIL ALLIANCE
“This is not just about me.
This is about so many others.”
-Abigail Burroughs
The Abigail Alliance was incorporated in the state of Virginia in November of 2001. However, the Alliance really started in early March of
1. Preston Lesley is a 2017 Juris Doctor candidate at North Carolina Central University School of
Law.
2.
3.
4.
5.

U.S. Const. amend. V.
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997).
Id.at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2268.
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a) (2015).
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2001 when Abigail, who had just turned twenty-one, had run out of conventional options in her battle against cancer, and was being treated at Johns
Hopkins Hospital. Abigail’s very talented oncologist urged her to try and
get the EGFR6 targeted drug C225 (Erbitux) from small Imclone Systems
or Iressa or very large Astra Zeneca. Abigail’s cancer cells had a very high
EGFR expression and her oncologist strongly felt these drugs had a very
significant chance of saving her life.
Abigail was still strong then as we worked hard and intelligently and
launched, with Abigail’s involvement and help, a three-pronged approach.
We lobbied the two pharmaceutical companies with much vigor including
getting help from some very influential people. Then we worked hard and
furiously to solicit Congressional help. With Abigail, we launched a media
effort that resulted in numerous stories in the press. As tired and weak as
she was, Abigail did multiple newspaper and television interviews. Through
those difficult times, Abigail’s devoted Mom, Kathleen Dunn, and Step
Dad, Gene Krueger, did so much to care and comfort Abigail in order to
help her retain as much independence as possible.
Abigail died on June 9, 2001, just a week and half after doing an extensive interview with Dale Solly of ABC WJLA TV. Abigail’s words in her
TV piece echoed the Abigail Alliance mission statement when she stated,
“This is not just about me. I am trying to help so many others.”7
-Abigail’s Father, Frank Burroughs
I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent can the terminally ill, in the United States of America,
pursue experimental medical treatment? When the prognosis is poor, and
there are no adequate medical alternatives, are the terminally ill afforded a
fundamental right to experimental medical treatment?
In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
Eschenbach,8 the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear Abigail Alliance’s (“the Alliance”) appeal from the United States District Court
of Columbia, which left the decision that the Alliance had not provided
6. Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor. Elevated levels of EGFR, a growth-factor-receptor tyrosine kinase, and/or its cognate ligands have been identified as a common component of multiple cancer
types and appear to promote solid tumor growth. RI Nicholson et al., EGFR and cancer prognosis, Eur J
Cancer (Sep. 2001), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11597399.
7. Abigail Alliance, Our Story, The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs
(2001-2009), http://www.abigail-alliance.org/story.php (last visited Feb 5, 2017).
8. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695
(2007).
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evidence of “a right to procure and use experimental drugs that is deeply
rooted in our Nation’s history” standing.9 This decision need not, however,
limit terminally ill patients to await the clinical testing process before gaining access to experimental drugs. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and Congress have created several programs designed to provide
early access to promising experimental drugs when warranted.10 Also, the
decision left open the option for the Alliance, the FDA, and the scientific
community to reach an option through the democratic process in the future.11
Medical treatment is continuously improving, and medicine has evolved
exponentially since the days of treatment by bloodletting12 and dressing
wounds with turpentine. However, modern medicine, while effective, is not
a cure-all.13 The decision in Abigail Alliance contains an in-depth analysis
of the clinical trial process that experimental medical drugs must undergo
before being made available to the general public. The decision further expands upon the Court’s rationale for denying the terminally ill unfettered
access to experimental drugs. Also, Abigail Alliance raises the issue of selfpreservation, a person’s fundamental rights, and the “inevitable tension
between early availability of products to patients, especially patients with
refractory disease, and the need to obtain sufficient data to provide a reasonable expectation of benefit and lack of excessive harm.” 14
This note will focus on the implied historical aspect, and rationale, used
in the Abigail Alliance decision, as well as the lasting effects the decision
will have on future medical advancements. This note will further provide a
factual overview of the case, and summary of the government’s involvement in the regulation of medical treatment in the United States. Finally,
this note buttresses the Court’s decision to preclude the terminally ill the
fundamental right to experimental drugs.
II. THE CASE
The case stems from a citizen petition the Abigail Alliance and the
Washington Legal Foundation submitted to FDA in 2003, requesting the
agency amend its investigational new drug application (IND) regulations to
create a policy “to grant initial approval for promising drugs, biologics, and
devices intended to treat life-threatening diseases with unmet needs,” and to
9. Id. at 727.
10. Id. at 699.
11. Id. at 714.
12. Science Museum, Brought to Life: Exploring History of Medicine: Bloodletting,
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/techniques/bloodletting (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
13. Dr. Kirkham et al., Wounds in the Middle Ages 18-20 (2014).
14. Letter from Peter J. Pitts, Associate Commissioner for External Relations, Department of
Health and Human Services, to Frank Burroughs, President, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 3 (Apr. 25, 2003).
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seek “regulatory changes to permit expanded availability of developmental
lifesaving drugs following phase one clinical trials and at all subsequent
stages of the trial and review process.”15 The Abigail Alliance began in
early March of 2001, when Abigail Burroughs, who had just turned twentyone, ran out of conventional treatment options in her battle against cancer.
Abigail’s oncologist urged her family to pursue experimental treatment,
which he felt would significantly improve Abigail’s chance of survival. 16
Abigail and her family launched an extensive effort to obtain the requested
experimental drug by lobbying pharmaceutical companies, soliciting Congressional help, and rallying to media to her cause.
Unfortunately, Abigail passed before receiving experimental treatment,
which may have saved her life. Nevertheless, her fight continued in the
work of the Alliance. Following Abigail’s passing, the Alliance took their
fight for experimental drugs to the United States Federal courts. In May,
2006, following an appeal from the United States District Court of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in
favor of the Abigail Alliance, and found that the United State Constitution protects the right of terminally ill patients to access treatments that are
not approved by the Food and Drug Administration.17
On March 1, 2007, following an appeal by the FDA, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reheard the case en banc. The
question presented on appeal was whether the Constitution provides terminally ill patients access to experimental drugs that have passed limited safety trials but have not been proven safe and effective.18 On August 7, 2007,
the Court issued an 8-2 decision against the Abigail Alliance, reversing the
previous panel decision, thereby upholding the District court’s decision that
found no constitutional right to unapproved drugs by terminally ill patients.19
III. BACKGROUND
1.
The Implied Rationale of the Court’s Decision: The Historical
Aspect
The overriding tension within Abigail Alliance is the “inevitable tension
between early availability of products to patients, especially patients with
refractory disease, and the need to obtain sufficient data to provide a rea15. Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara, D.C. Circuit Court Rules in Abigail Alliance Case; Affirms
District Court Ruling That There is No Fundamental Right of Access to Experimental Drugs for the
Terminally
Ill,
FDA
Law
Blog
(Aug
7,
2007,
10:41
AM),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2007/08/dc-circuit-cour.html.
16. Abigail Alliance, supra note 7.
17. Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara, supra note 15.
18. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 697.
19. Id.
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sonable expectation of benefit and lack of excessive harm.”20 But why is the
United States government so concerned with the possibility of a person
harming himself or herself when they are on the brink of death? The answer
to this question may exist in common law, which is the precursor of the
United States legal system, and the likelihood of “felo de se”, Latin for
“felon of himself”, the common law legal term for suicide. 21
In thirteenth century England, suicide, or “self-murder” became a crime
under common law in England. However, suicide was long condemned as a
mortal sin in the eyes of the Church. If a death were to be declared a suicide, the deceased would be denied a Christian burial, carried to a crossroads in the dead of night, and dumped in a pit, with a wooden stake
hammed though the body pinning it in place. There would be no members
of the clergy and no prayers offered. This lack of burial was morbid; however, the punishment did not end with death. The deceased’s family was
stripped of their belongings and they were escheated to the Crown. As noted by historian Michael MacDonald, “the suicide of an adult male could
reduce his survivors to pauperism.”22
The Court’s denial to hear the Alliance’s petition for appeal may also be
akin to its decision in Washington v. Glucksberg.23 In Washington, a group
of doctors and terminally ill patients filed suit against the State of Washington challenging the constitutionality of a law which made it a crime to assist
another in committing suicide. The district court found that terminally ill
patients have a liberty interest protected by the Constitution to commit physician-assisted suicide, and the Washington law violated the Constitution.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, and affirmed the district
court decision. The State of Washington appealed the decision to the United
States Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the district court and
court of appeals.24
In Washington, the Court developed a two-part test to determine whether
a liberty interest is fundamental and protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution.25 First, the asserted right must have historically been regarded as fundamental, or as the Court reasoned, “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.”26 Second, the asserted right must be carefully
20. Letter from Peter J. Pitts, supra note 14.
21. Gerry
Holt,
When
Suicide
was
Illegal,
BBC
(Aug.
3,
2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14374296.
22. Id.
23. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997).
24. Washington v. Glucksberg – Washington Law Challenged, Law Library – American Law and
Legal
Information,
http://law.jrank.org/pages/24239/Washington-v-Glucksberg-Washington-LawChallenged.html
25. Id.
26. Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1934 (1977)
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described and defined. The Court concluded that the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide did not meet either of those requirements. The Court
reasoned that the right to assisted suicide was not deeply rooted in America’s history because almost every state and most democratic nations have
laws banning assisted suicide. Further, “for over 700 years, the AngloAmerican common-law tradition has punished and otherwise disapproved
of both suicide and assisting suicide.”27 A quote that harkens back to “felo
de se.” Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored the majority decision, concluded with the following phrase, “Throughout the Nation, Americans are
engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”28
Thus, the Court’s decision in Abigail Alliance, along with the landmark
decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, which denied the fundamental right
to assisted-suicide, display the Court’s reluctance to provide an individual
with the means to commit “felo de se.”29 Also, both opinions reflect the
Court’s reluctance to make law and provide for the debate to continue in the
legislature.
2.
Government Regulation of Medical Treatment
The pillar of the Alliance’s petition in Abigail Alliance was “preventing
access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients . . . must be subject
to strict scrutiny because [it] interferes with a fundamental constitutional
right.”30 As mentioned above, the Court described its “established method
of substantive-due-process analysis” as having two primary features.31 As
stated in Glucksberg, “First, we [the Court] have regularly observed that the
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Second, we [the Court] have
required in substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”32 The Alliance argued the government’s history, or lack thereof, of regulating medical treatment can be
found in our Nation’s history and traditions because “the government never
interfered with the judgment of individual doctors about the medical effica-

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

American Law and Legal Information, supra note 24.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
Id. at 702.
Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 701
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720
Id. at 720, 721.
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cy of drugs until 1962.”33 However, the Court in Abigail Alliance provided
an extensive history of government regulation to counter this argument.
While the Alliance focused their argument on the medical efficacy (effectiveness) of particular drugs, their argument failed to realize the Nation’s
regulation of the safety of drugs. Or as the Court stated, “the Alliance’s
effort to focus on efficacy regulation ignores one simple fact: it is unlawful
for the Alliance to procure experimental drugs not only because they have
not been proven effective, but because they have not been proven safe.”34
Thus, “in order for the Alliance to succeed on its claim of a fundamental
right of access for the terminally ill to experimental drugs, the Alliance
must show not only that there is a tradition of access to drugs that have not
yet been proven effective, but also a tradition of access to drugs that have
not yet been proven safe.”35 The Court concluded that the Nation has long
expressed an interest in drug regulation and provided the following history
of the U.S. Government’s drug regulation.
In the early history of the United States, the Court observes not a tradition of protecting a right of access to drugs, but rather governments responding to the risks of new compounds as they become aware of and able
to address those risks. Drug regulation in the United States began with the
Colonies and States when the Colony of Virginia’s legislature passed an act
in 1736 that addressed the dispensing of more drugs than was “necessary or
useful” because that practice had become “dangerous and intolerable.”36 In
1808, the territory of Louisiana passed an act requiring a diploma before
permitting pharmacists to dispense drugs.37 South Carolina passed a similar
act in 1817, followed by Georgia in 1825, and Alabama in 1852.38 In 1848,
the Import Drug Act, banned “imported adulterated drugs” after a Congressional committee concluded that “this country had become the grand mart
and receptacle of all the refuse [drug] merchandise . . . not only from the
European warehouses, but from the whole Eastern world.”39 Congress acted
again when it passed the Biologics Controls Act of 1902, in response to a
series of deadly reactions to a tainted diphtheria vaccine that killed children
in New Jersey and Missouri.40 Thus, the examples presented by the Court
bolstered the argument that drug regulation is indeed rooted in America’s
history and traditions.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 703.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703-704.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705.
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3. Modern Governmental Regulation of Medical Treatment
The current regime of federal drug regulation began to take shape with
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”).41 The FDCA requires drug manufacturers provide proof that their products are safe prior to
being marketed. Additionally, the FDCA prohibits false therapeutic claims.
Notably, the drug industry “strenuously objected” to the 1938 Act “ostensibly on the ground that it would deprive the American people of the right to
self-medication,” an argument not unlike the Alliance’s position of today.42
Following the Court’s opinion that governmental regulation was historically rooted in our Nation’s history, the Court tackled modern governmental regulation beginning with the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA, commonly known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments.43 The Alliance contends that prior to these Amendments, which were enacted in response to
birth defects in babies whose mother’s had taken Thalidomide to ease
morning sickness, patients were free to make their own decisions about
whether a drug may be effective.44 The Kefauver-Harris Amendments set in
place the extensive, and time consuming method of gaining FDA approval
we know today.
As stated above, the method to obtain FDA approval can be a long and
tedious process. First, an experimental drug’s sponsor, often a drug manufacturer, must submit an application for approval. The application “must
contain full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in
use.” 45 These reports rely largely on clinical trial with human subjects.
However, before a sponsor can even begin human testing, it must submit an
investigational new drug application (IND) to the FDA for approval. If the
IND is approved, several phases of clinical trials can begin.46 The clinical
trial process averages three phases, which on average last up to seven years
to complete.47 Phase one consists of a small sample group to determine if
the drug is safe enough for continued human testing.48 Phase two studies are
“well controlled” trials used to evaluate both “effectiveness” and “safety”
with side effects.49 Lastly, phase three is an expanded trial containing many
subjects to evaluate the overall “benefit-risk” relationship.50 The seven
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

21 U.S.C.A. § 301 (2016).
Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 705.
Id. at 725.
Id.
21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (2015).
Id.
Am. Compl. P15.
21 C.F.R. § 312.21.
Id. § 312.21(a)(1).
Id. § 312.21(c).
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years of clinical trials, the Alliance argues, is precious time a terminally ill
patient could be undergoing treatment by the experimental drug.
IV. FROM EXPERIMENTAL TO EFFECTIVE
According to Merriam-Webster, the definition of experimental is “...done
in order to see how well something works.”51 The FDA defines experimental as “any use of a drug except for the use of a market drug in the
course of medical practice.”52 Where the above two definitions intersect is
the “use” of the experimental drug in order to test its effectiveness. As previously mentioned, the FDCA generally prohibits access to new drugs unless and until they have been approved by the FDA.53 However, as the Alliance alleged in Abigail Alliance, the experimental process is an “extremely
lengthy one,” which impedes a terminally ill patient from receiving possibly life-saving medical treatment.54
Following the Courts historical approach to the Alliance’s argument that
government regulation of safety and efficacy was not in existence until the
1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, the Court supported its decision by
providing a counterarguments to the Alliance’s several common law doctrines, which argued that barring access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients is “inconsistent with the way that our legal tradition treats
persons in all other life-threatening situations.”55 The Alliance argued three
doctrines: 1) the doctrine of necessity; 2) the tort of intentional interference
with rescue; and 3) the right to self-defense.56
1. The Doctrine of Necessity
Looking first to the Alliance’s necessity argument, the Alliance invoked
the common law doctrine of necessity, which “traditionally covered the
situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal
conduct the lesser of two evils.”57 However, the Alliance offers little detail
about how necessity would apply to its case. Furthermore, in the 2001 case
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, the Court made it
clear that Congress may eliminate a necessity defense that might otherwise
be available.58 Thus, in light of Congress’s limiting of experimental drugs
by law, and the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the common law defense
51. Experimental,
Merriam-Webster,
available
at
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/experimental(last visited Feb.10 2017).
52. 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
54. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 698.
55. Id. at 703.
56. Id.
57. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, 532 U.S. 483, 490, 121 S. Ct. 1711, 149 L.
Ed. 2d 722 (2001) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 100 S. Ct. 624, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575
(1980)).
58. Id. at 493, 121 S. Ct. at 1719.
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of necessity remains controversial and cannot override a value judgment
already determined by the legislature, the common law doctrine of necessity provides little support to the Alliance’s proposed right.59
2. The Tort of Intentional Interference With Lifesaving Efforts
Additionally, the Alliance raised the tort of intentional interference with
lifesaving efforts, which the Restatement of Torts defines as “intentionally
preventing a third person from giving to another aid necessary to his bodily
security.”60 But this doctrine is not analogous to the facts of this case. The
Alliance seeks access to drugs that are experimental and have not been
shown to be safe, let alone effective at (or “necessary” for) prolonging life.
Altruistically, the Alliance concedes that taking experimental drugs can
“involve enormous risks.” In essence, Alliance insists on a constitutional
right to assume any level of risk.61 This alleged right to assume “any level
of risk,” especially an “enormous risk,” set a substantial bar to the Alliance’s argument.
3. The Doctrine of Self-Defense
The final, and most interesting, common law argument presented by the
Alliance centered on the doctrine of self-defense. The common law doctrine of self-defense provides that “one who is not the aggressor . . . is justified in using a reasonable amount of force against his adversary when he
reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily
harm from his adversary, and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to
avoid this danger.”62
The Alliance argued that the landmark abortion case of Roe v. Wade,
which addressed a “right of personal privacy” also gave women the fundamental right to abort a fetus at any stage of a pregnancy if doing so is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.63 Applying that argument
here, “the Alliance argues that because its terminally ill members are in
immediate danger of harm from cancer, they can use whatever medical
means are necessary to defend themselves.”64 The Court reasoned that the
Alliance’s argument was not about using force to defend oneself, but about
the constitutional right to “assume enormous risk.”65 Accordingly, “unlike
the cases in which the doctrine of self-defense might be properly invoked,
this case involves risk from drugs with no proven therapeutic effect, which
at a minimum separates this example from the abortion “life of the mother”
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 708
Restatement (First) of Torts § 326 (1934).
Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 703.
Wayne R. Lafave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4 (2d ed. 2003).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d at 709.
Id. at 710.
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exception.66 In brief, the Alliance’s own acknowledgment that its right
would involve “enormous risk” sets it apart from the “life of the mother”
exception, which has been proven effective.
V. CONCLUSION
For the majority of our Nation’s history the United States Court System
has attempted to steer clear of decisions, which would “make law” and not
“decide law.” On August 7, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia continued this tradition by refusing to legislate
through the Court a new fundamental right to experimental drugs.67 Using
the Court’s rationale, this decision was made to ensure those with terminal
illnesses maintain their quality of life, and not expose themselves to enhanced risk.
The efforts of the Alliance are praiseworthy; however, the burden of allowing citizens to expose themselves to detrimental harm would undoubtedly fall in the hands of the government. Accordingly, the government
enacts rules and regulations to protect its citizens, not intentionally harm
them. It should also be noted that the government is not the only one in
opposition to the Alliance’s requests. Other “members of the cancer community” have suggested that the FDA needs to maintain a strong clinical
trial system as the basis of the approval of cancer drugs.68 Thus, this inevitable tension rests not only in the courts, but the cancer community.
It was no mistake the Court echoed the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist
at the close of its opinion, “our holding today ensures that this debate
among the Alliance, the FDA, the scientific and medical communities, and
the public may continue through the democratic process.”69 Accordingly,
not all hope is lost for those who fight for access to experimental drugs
when faced with certain death. Moreover, the Court has made it abundantly
clear in the past and present, that this fight will take place in Congress, and
not the judiciary.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 495 F.3d 695.
Letter from Peter J. Pitts, supra note 14.
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735, 117 S. Ct. 2258, (1997).

